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Abstract 
A lot has changed in football in the last decades. These changes were mainly driven by the 
appearance of the mega sized Champions League and the Bosman Case, making this industry 
a very good case study in the financial area. This study identifies the main determinants of 
football club’s revenues and success between 2009 and 2012. This study will be a 
breakthrough not only in finance literature, but also in the football industry. To our best 
knowledge there is no studies regarding the football industry in the field of identification of 
success determinants in the European main competitions (Champions League and Europa 
League) and the relation of that success (or lack of) to the club’s revenues. Our results 
showed a positive correlation between market area and sportive success with higher revenues. 
Regarding success, results showed that wages, total assets and capital expenditures in the year 
before are positively correlated. However, the clubs that don’t control their expenses in 
relation to their revenues tend to not succeed as they predicted. 
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1. Introduction  
Before being a business, football is supposed to be an entertainment show with a very 
deep social impact in almost every country in Europe, where the fans play a major role 
in the club decisions and the primary objective is to win to keep the fans happy and 
proud. 
With time, something has changed and football became a major business in 
Europe where the common fans have little or nothing to say about how the club (or 
more precisely the company) is managed. On one hand because they don’t understand 
the new concepts of football management which encompasses planning, risk 
management and financial management and on other hand because the fundamental 
sports objectives which is the fans objectives can enter in conflict with the investors 
intentions (Nagy, 2012).  
For Peeters (2011) one of the biggest changes in European football was the 
appearance of the Champions League as a supranational competition. The huge 
financial compensations paid to the participants in this league have an important impact 
on their performance at national level. Additionally, Champions League defines itself as 
the world’s most important club competition and a good performance 1  in this 
competition normally means a significant appreciation of the value of the assets of the 
clubs while a bad campaign in that competition normally has the opposite effect. 
Another important cause of this change occurred in 1995 when the European 
Court of Justice ruled in the Bosman Case that the player transfer system and 
restrictions on the maximum number of foreign players were illegal violations of the 
treaty of Rome. Before this, players could not move freely from one club to another 
even after the end of the contract, unless the involved clubs agreed on a transfer fee and 
the clubs could only hire a limited number of non-national players. These limitations on 
mobility kept the wages low. After those changes the financial impact was huge and the 
wages escalated to what was believed to be incredible levels at the time (Andreff and 
Staudohar 2000).  
The changes occurred in European football created new reality for fans and 
company shareholders. Fans need to understand the importance that a responsible and 
                                                 
1
 The definition of “good performance” varies according to each club expectations 
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competent financial management has for the sporting future of their team and for the 
sustainability of the entire industry. Shareholders need understand the relation between 
winning and the value of a team as a company. A very well managed team/business is 
the team/business that balances the financial and sporting performance because in this 
industry one can’t succeed without the other, (Baroncelli and Lago 2006). There are 
several known cases in which clubs went almost or completely bankrupt because of 
their attempt to reach greatness in countries like England, Scotland, Portugal or Italy.  
As the European football has been experiencing considerable levels of financial 
instability, the annually increase of revenues across European football industry should 
be seen as a golden opportunity for controlling the industry costs and enhance its 
financial stability. However, what truly is happening is that teams across Europe are 
investing millions of Euros every year buying players at an increasingly price, 
increasing each year their payrolls with the objective of not only making good internal 
championships but also to succeed in the European competitions. This behavior has 
created an inflationary trend in the European football industry. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the main financial drivers of 
sportive success in the industry of football. To do so, we will follow the Virtuous Circle 
between sportive results and financial resources as Lago et al (2004). The Virtuous 
Circle starts with the necessary financial power to purchase the talent needed to create 
the most competitive team possible in order to achieve the better results possible. With 
success the teams should increase their revenues through match day tickets, 
merchandising, TV rights or asset appreciation, which will be necessary to restart the 
cycle. This brings us to the main hypothesis that we attempt to answer on this study: 
 Are the revenues of European clubs correlated with success and the economic 
power of the surrounding football club area? 
 What determines success of football clubs in Europe? 
Although there are other studies regarding football industry determinants, the 
existing literature is focused on studying national leagues, leaving a big gap in the 
existing literature about the football industry: studies about the most important football 
league in the world The UEFA Champions League (CL) that as argued by Peeters 
(2011) is an important determinant of national success. 
 3 
We have used data of 31 football clubs from 9 different European countries. 
Football clubs in our study are among the best football clubs in the world, such as Real 
Madrid, Barcelona, Bayern Munich, Manchester United, Chelsea, Juventus, FC Porto or 
SL Benfica. Our study will cover the years 2009 to 2012 with data from 2008 to 2012.  
The reminder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature and similar studies. Section 3 presents the database used in this study. Section 
4 addresses the methodology followed by the presentation of the success variable in 
section 5. Section 6 discusses the empirical results and section 7 concludes.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. The European Football Industry 
With the changes in European football after the Bosman Case, it is easily observable 
that the changes did not happen only in the costs side but also in the revenues side. In 
the season of 2000/2001 the aggregate revenue of all clubs in the top divisions 
throughout Europe was €6.6 billion. In the 2011/2012 season, this number rose to €19.4 
billion
2
 meaning an increase of 194% in little more than a decade, representing an 
average growth of more than 17% per year. In the same period in the 28 countries of 
European Union, according to Eurostat the yearly inflation rate was only two years 
above 3%. This tendency is recorded despite the major financial crisis that started after 
the 2008 Lehman Brothers bankrupt and only in the last year, the revenues grew 11%. 
German Bundesliga, Spanish La liga, Frensh Ligue 1, English Premier League and 
Italian Serie A (the 5 major football leagues) contribute with 9,3 Billion which 
corresponds to 48% of the total European market share. Each one of these leagues 
reached record levels on revenue which suggests that the football industry still have 
growth potential. 
The wage costs of the top five leagues combined reached €6.1 billion in 2011/12 
which represents a 8% growth when compared to the 2010/11 season. This means that 
despite the European financial crisis, the salaries in football are also still rising which 
goes in favor of the hypothesis of inflationary trend in European football.  
However there are good signals coming from football clubs finances. In 2012, for 
the first time since UEFA started collecting and analyzing Europe-wide club financial 
data the revenue growth was bigger than the wage growth. The same report shows that 
the player’s value on balance sheet represents 48% of the original purchase value, 
(UEFA 2013)
3
. Considering that the biggest clubs don’t normally buy players to sell 
later at a higher price, and most of the aggregate value of football players in Europe is 
concentrated in the biggest clubs balance sheet, it is not a surprise.  
                                                 
2
 All data from Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance 2013 and Deloitte & Touche Annuel Review of Football Finance 2003 
3 UEFA club benchmarking report: 2013/2014 season 
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2.2. Steps towards the football industry sustainability 
Even before UEFA, Bundesliga was already giving significant steps towards financial 
stability and efficient governance mechanisms. First the clubs are obligated to have 
more than 50% of voting power which prevent that very rich foreign persons invest 
there, second the league also controls the clubs spending which is a prudent measure 
because financial control is necessary. On the downside it can hold back the German 
Clubs in terms of European competitions, Szymanski (2010). 
Later, UEFA also gave a step forward and issued the Financial Fair Play (FFP)
4
 
Regulation making all clubs competing in UEFA club competitions to be under their 
scope. The regulation was characterized by the president of UEFA Michel Platini with 
the following words: “These new FFP requirements which have been phased in since 
2010 represent one of the most ambitious but necessary projects in the world of sports 
governance.” (UEFA 2013). The main reasons behind the UEFA financial fair play 
rules according to UEFA are to: “introduce more discipline and rationality in club 
football finances; decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary 
effect; encourage clubs to compete with(in) their revenues; encourage long-term 
investments in the youth sector and infrastructure; protect the long-term viability of 
European club football; ensure clubs settle their liabilities on a timely basis
5”.  
The clubs playing in European competitions need to prepare themselves for the 
new UEFA financial fair play rules. The wage costs represent around 66% of total 
revenues in the top 5 major leagues making the costs on human capital the main cost on 
the football clubs income statements and wages are specified for the break even 
requirement that started to take place in the current season, 2013-14 (UEFA Financial 
Fair Play Regulations Art. 58-63).  
Costs control is an important UEFA issue because although revenues are growing 
European football is facing financial instability. According to Muller, et al (2012) the 
reason why UEFA decided to take action and issued the Financial Fair Play Regulation 
is to ensure a level of integrity in UEFA competitions limiting the so called “financial 
                                                 
4
 Financial fair play rules says that clubs can spend up to €5 million more than they earn per assessment 
period (three years). However it can exceed this level to a certain limit (€45 million in 2014/2015) if it is 
entirely covered by a direct contribution/payment from the club owner(s) or a related party. Sanctions for 
not complying can go from a small warning to not be able to register in European competitions. 
5
 http://www.uefa.org/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay/ 
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doping” by new (very rich) investors and to ensure financial stability in the future of 
European football. Barros (2006) stated that football clubs are financially mismanaged 
and the main reasons are lack of efficient corporate governance mechanisms as well as 
the following of win maximizing strategies and Dimitropoulos (2011) believes that 
although the new regulation is a good step towards a brighter future of European 
football industry, without the incorporation of efficient monitoring and governance 
mechanisms in clubs the current financial status of the clubs will not be efficiently 
improved by the new UEFA regulation.  
Dimitropoulos, (2011) and Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos, (2012) argued about 
the importance of corporate governance mechanisms as tools to achieve a positive 
impact in the financial markets and the later study concluded that efficient corporate 
governance mechanisms in football clubs can lead to greater levels of profitability, and 
improve the clubs solvency which could result in a positive contribution for a better 
financial market performance.  
 
2.3. Win Maximization vs. Profit Maximization 
Solber and Haugen (2010) found that European football clubs, contrary to North 
American clubs, are not profit maximizing. Instead they are win maximizing. Win 
maximization clubs often hire more talent than they can afford. So other things being 
equal, aggregate profit of win maximizing clubs are lower because costs increase and 
profits decrease when more talent is hired. However, with no restrictions across 
countries in salaries, the most effective instrument to improve performance is to have 
more talent. A different strategy with lower talent purchased and lower costs could have 
in long term a negative impact because bad results in the pitch normally mean reduction 
of revenues. In order to avoid that trap, football clubs in Europe adopt a more 
aggressive strategy in the competition for talent. This strategy more than being the main 
cause for the costs increase is also the reason for the lack of correlation between 
revenues and costs in football clubs. 
Késenne (2009) argues that players in a win maximization league are overpaid and that 
can lead to financial problems. Szymanski and Smith (1997) concluded that clubs are 
able to follow a win maximization strategy because of a failure of the market to 
corporate control in the industry that creates obstacles to take overs and acquisitions. 
 7 
 
2.4 Football industry: Efficiency and Determinants 
Hass (2003) argued that there are teams that are spending too much money in players 
and coaches and are not getting both sufficient sport results and revenues. He also 
argues that there are teams from bigger towns that should have higher revenues, or in 
another words, their social impact is lower than it should be.  
Szymanski and Smith (1997) argued that in the English league the amount of skill 
a club purchases determines its position in the League. With similar results, Barajas and 
Rodríguez (2010) studied the Spanish league and explained that the production function 
in football is linked to the sports entertainment offered in the matches to the audience, 
therefore the players are essential elements to develop team production, and that is the 
reason why they represent the main part of the football clubs expenses. They argued that 
the league outcome is significantly explained by the expenses on players. On the other 
hand revenues are explained by both market size/sporting outcomes. There is also a 
correlation between total revenues and expenses on players, and almost all debt belongs 
to the most competitive clubs.  
Mourao (2012) studied the Portuguese league debt and said that the most 
competitive clubs enter in the so called “race of indebtedness” for three major reasons. 
First, clubs face the pressure from the investors and the supporters to win. Second the 
inflationary wage trend in European football that occurs because of the competition for 
top players among the leagues. This inflationary trend has a negative impact to the game 
because it doesn’t correspond to an increase in player’s quality. The last reason is that 
players and managers are valued not only by their talent, but also for their media 
potential, which is a big source of revenue but at the same time a reason to spend more 
money. However soccer teams should have better control of their costs since the 
increase of debt/indebtedness can lead to restrictions on the players’ wages that will 
subsequently lead to lower the team quality in the future. A lot of football clubs do not 
have sustainable debts making their market value to deteriorate. In the Portuguese case, 
it was observed that the debt ratio of Portuguese clubs is positively influenced by a 
higher share of wages in the costs structure, by a higher number of points achieved in 
the championship and by a larger market area. 
 8 
Hoffmann et al. (2002) studied the socio economic determinants national teams 
performance and the results show that factors such as culture, demography, geography 
and per capita level are important determinants of success. The impact that the market 
area has in a football club success was also studied by Barros (2006) and by Mourao 
(2008) for Portuguese football. Both studies confirmed that first, the Portuguese league 
structure of success is a reflection of its cities with the three most successful teams and 
every champions in the league history coming from the two most important cities and 
second, the population size, income per capita and the number of infrastructures are 
positively correlated with the ability of achieving sportive success. On the same subject, 
Mourao (2010) made a very important contribution, studying the regional determinants 
of competitiveness in Europe, using the UEFA Champions League achievements as 
measure of success, and found that although the absolute population of the area where 
the club comes from is important for success, the proportion of people living in the area 
when compared to the evolving region is more important. It was also pointed out the 
importance of urban population and income per capita of the area. This study confirms 
the idea that the place where the club come from does matter not only in a regional level 
but also in international level.  
Peeters, (2011) studied what shapes the competitive balance of football and found 
evidence that a participation in Champions League has a negative effect in the national 
leagues competitive balance because of the prize money and broadcast rights revenues 
given to the participants. Also, the competitive balance of the Champions League, as 
long as any other league, can be enhanced if the prizes and TV rights revenues are more 
equalitarian distributed among all clubs, instead of always giving higher shares to the 
already richest clubs. Mourao (2012) shares the same opinion and also believes that a 
more egalitarian distribution of TV rights would result in an improvement of the 
financial sustainability of more clubs. 
Lago et al (2004) studied the Italian league and described football as a Virtuous 
Circle in which the level of competitiveness of a team depends on the clubs financial 
power measured by revenues and this will determine the success that a team has, which 
in turn will determine the revenues. It is a never ending cycle that repeats itself. Among 
national leagues this cycle is easily observed, since the difference between the top teams 
and the others is normally huge. But when the goal is the CL, the prize is only as big as 
 9 
the temptation to get it. There are teams taking big risks and in some national leagues 
there are teams that find very hard to keep the balance between both European 
Competitions and National League. When this happens the results can be very bad in 
both competitions.  
As we have seen most studies cover national leagues or talk about the socio-
economic determinants of national success. So, the idea is to join and replicate the main 
ideas in an international level covering the existing gap. Although there consensus 
opinions among the authors regarding the importance of the purchasing of talent to 
success in the short term among national leagues, there is not clear results regarding 
long terms, because normally the studies cover one season. On the other hand national 
leagues are far less competitive than the CL meaning that talent purchase by itself may 
not be enough to succeed in Europe because the competition for talent is huge. 
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3. Data 
We proposed to study European competitions from the year 2009 to the year 2012. We 
were able to gather relevant data from 33 major European clubs. Our sample includes 
all European football clubs that make public available their Annual report.
6
 
In order to understand if the “virtuous circle” of Lago et al (2004) exists in 
European level, first we needed to gather socio-economic data such as city population, 
country population, GDP per capita and GDP Variation. More importantly, we also 
needed the football clubs financial data such as the debt ratio, total liabilities, total 
financial debt, medium and long term financial debt, capex, total assets, revenues, 
wages, players value, variation of debt, variation of liabilities, depreciations and 
amortization.  
 
3.1. Data Sources 
The financial data was collected from the clubs annual reports. For all the clubs 
listed in stock market we took the balance sheets and income statements provided by the 
Financial Times website
7
 – here all data is uniform and with easy access. For the French 
clubs we took our data from the website of the French League, the “Ligue De Football 
professionnel”8.  
The data needed for our most valuable variable, the success, was taken from a 
highly respected soccer website, www.zerozero.pt while the socio-economic data was 
gathered from the World Bank data base
9
 and from Eurostat
10
.  
The coach variable is a dummy variable that assumes 1 if the club coach changes 
in a specific year and 0 if the club coach didn’t change. This information was obtained 
in Wikipedia
11
. 
                                                 
6
 For the years 2009 and 2011 we have only information for 32 clubs and in a later stage of our 
dissertation 2 clubs were excluded for lack of data and sportive results–FC Basel and AIK Fotboll. 
7
 http://www.ft.com/home/europe 
8
 www.lfp.fr 
9
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
10
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database 
11
 In the wikipédia page of each club, there is a link for managers list. If we decided to put all the links for 
this variable, we would have to put more than thirty links, so we are going to put one example.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_F.C._Porto_managers 
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All the data of the clubs outside the Euro Area was presented in their home 
currency, so we had to convert the home currency to Euros. For that we took the 
historical exchange rates from onda.com website. 
 
3.2. Sample Description 
Table 1 details the descriptive statistics of our sample. A few important things can be 
observed from the results. 
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
The sample has annual data from 31 football clubs from 9 different countries between 2008 and 2012 and 
does not include market potential variables – PIB per capita and football clubs home city population. 
WAGES_REVENUESt is the ratio between wages and revenues. DEBT_VARIATIONt  is the total 
financial debt yearly variation in % and LIABILITIES_VARIATIONt  is the total liabilities yearly 
variation in %. The values that are not ratios or success are in millions of euros. 
 
 
First, from 2009 to 2012, the clubs in our sample achieved on average (median) 
revenues equal to €161.37 million (€138.44 million). The revenues range from an 
average of €13.2 million in the case of Braga to €439.18 million in the case of 
Barcelona
12
. Regarding the wages, during the same period the clubs spent on average 
(median) is €98.04 million (€93.77 million) ranging from €0.51 million (Trazbonspor) 
to €251.43 million (Manchester City).  
During the four year period, the average (median) capital expenditures was €12.71 
million (€6.05 million). However if we analyze the maximum or minimum value 
invested, we observe that in a given season there are teams that make huge investments, 
                                                 
12
 In the case of the revenue in a single year, the highest value was attained by Real Madrid in 2012 (€514 
million) 
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whether to “build” a team or upgrading the club’s infrastructures. During this period the 
club that made the highest investment was Bayern Munich in 2011 (€209.03 million) 
and the lowest investment was Barcelona (€ -78.52 million) also in 201113. 
Regarding the size of the club, the clubs in our sample have on average (median) 
total assets equal to €308.68 million (€261.3 million). The biggest and only club in the 
world to pass the mark of one billion of euros in assets is Manchester United, and the 
smallest club in our sample is Braga. Naturally the biggest financial debt and liabilities 
amounts are mostly among the biggest clubs. 
As to the capital structure, the average (median) debt ratio is 0,84 (0,79). The 
highest leveraged club is the Turkish club Besiktas with a 3,77 debt ratio and the club 
with the lower percentage of liabilities used to finance its  assets is Fenerbahce.  
Graph 1 represents the same statistics as table 1 but it can give a better insight on 
what some of these statistics means.  
 
Graph 1 – Summary statistics 
Graph 1 is a combination of BoxPlot graphics in some of the most important variables between 2009 and 
2012. Revenues and Wages are in millions of euros.  
 
 
Looking at the revenues in Graphic 1 we observe that most of the sample seems to 
fall in the lower part of the graphic meaning that the 25% of the clubs are much richer 
than the other 75%.  
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 The negative value comes from the “sale” of football players. 
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The wages graph presents a similar shape as the revenues graph. However the 
difference between the top 25% clubs and the rest of the clubs (especially the clubs 
between the median and the third quartile) is not so big as in revenues, which suggests 
that there are clubs that even with less revenues are trying to close the gap in the 
competition for talent, spending a higher percentage of its revenues in wages than the 
top 25%. 
Although only 25% of the clubs have higher debt than assets, about 75% of the 
clubs in the sample are financing their assets mostly with debt. 
Graph 2 presents the ratio between revenues and wages. There is an increase in 
wages bigger than revenues in 2010 and 2011. In 2012 despite the growth in the Turkish 
clubs salaries payments, in the entire sample finally the wages grew less than the 
revenues. The sample mean in 2012 is under 58%, far from the maximum of 70% 
recommended by UEFA. However there are still clubs that spend more money in 
salaries than they earn in revenues. 
 
Graph 2 - Wages revenues ratio between 2009 and 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2012 the sum of the revenues of the clubs in our sample was €5.545 billion, 
representing 29% of the entire European market which is €19.4€ billion, and 59% of the 
top five European leagues combined
14
. The top 6 success clubs represent 41% of the 
sample’s revenues and 26% of the sample’s total liabilities (6 clubs represented 19% of 
the sample).   
 
                                                 
14
 Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance 2013 
 14 
4. The Model 
In this chapter the variables will be explained, the methodology used will be described and 
the sample will be defined. As already told in the bibliographic revision, Lago et al (2004) 
argued in their study about Italian football about a Virtuous Circle that exists in football 
among the biggest and the smaller clubs. They argue that while the smaller clubs need to 
invest on younger and cheaper talent (even here some financial power is needed) to 
construct a competitive team and later collect money with higher revenues or by selling 
these players to bigger teams allowing the cycle to repeat. The bigger clubs with more 
financial resources are able to construct strong teams that lead them to better results and 
consequently raise their revenues through merchandising, TV rights sells and match day 
tickets sells. To confirm the existence of the virtuous circle among the biggest European 
clubs and to understand it, we need to first understand the drivers of financial power, 
measured by the revenues (our first dependent variable) needed to construct the competitive 
team. We also need to investigate what are the determinants of success and if the success 
actually increases the revenues. This is the primal objective of the study and to meet the 
objectives it was fundamental to construct and define a variable “Success” (our second 
dependent variable).  
We use panel data regressions and in all our regressions we report standard errors 
that are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the team level, covering the 
study period between 2009 and 2012. 
 
4.1. Determinants of Revenues Hypothesis 
This section sets out the empirical methodology to analyze if there is any evidence that 
Virtuous Circle exists. The determinants of financial power will fit in two categories: 
Market Area (Mourão 2008 and Mourão 2010), Success (Lago et al 2004).  
Financial Powerit = f (Market Areait, Successit,) 
 
The club’s revenues are used as proxy for financial power (dependent variable) 
since the clubs that are normally considered the richest in the world of football are 
always the clubs with higher revenues.  
As exogenous variable that proxies for regional economic development we use the 
city population of each club divided by the number of clubs in the city that played in the 
CL during the period analyzed and the country GDP per capita of each club. Finally the 
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(international) success of a team will be measured according to a new variable that takes 
into account how each team performed/advanced in the European competitions in each 
of the years analyzed
15
. Given the exponential characteristics of this variable the 
logarithmic of the variable “success” will also be, alternatively used. 
 
4.2. Determinants of Success Hypothesis 
In order to identify the determinants of success, several variables grouped according to 
the Competitiveness of a team (Lago et al 2004), Coach (Haas 2003), Size (UEFA 
2010; Oberstone 2009; Mourão 2012) and Leverage will be used as exogenous 
variables: 
Successit = f (Competitive teamit, Change in coachit, Sizeit, Debtit) 
 
Our measure of success (or its logarithmic) will be used as dependent variable. As 
proxy for the team competitiveness we are going to use wages and the ratio wages over 
revenues. 
Wages are the best proxy for player’s talent. In a perfect competitive industry, each 
player is expected to receive his marginal revenue product in revenues. The common 
sense is that you get in performance for what you pay (Szymanski and Smith 1997).   
As proxy for change in coach, we are going to use a dummy variable that assumes 
number 1 when there is a change in coach during or in the pre-season or 0 otherwise. A 
change in coach can happen due bad results or less likely because the coach wants to go 
somewhere else. That change can affect the success of a team for both ways, and 
without a good coach it is not likely that any team would have a good season.  
As proxy for size we will use total assets of the clubs. The biggest clubs are the 
clubs that have made higher investment over the time not only in players but in 
infrastructures. Kern, et al (2012) argued that the net transfer activity is a valuable input 
for sportive performance as shows the club activities in the transfer market or in other 
words, mainly the club investment in talent. Given that, we are also going to use as a 
proxy for the net transfer activity the total Capital Expenditures.  
                                                 
15
 The construction of the variable success will be explained in the next Chapter 
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Finally, we will use as proxy for leverage the total liabilities of each club as well as 
the change on total liabilities. The total liabilities of a club can influence the success of 
a team because football clubs may incur in debt in an attempt for success or to improve 
the club’s infrastructures.  
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5. European Competitions and the Construction of the Success 
Variable 
5.1. European Elite play in the CL 
It is widely accepted that the UEFA Champions League (CL) is the most important 
football club competition in the World. It is organized every year since 1956 and since 
its first edition until now it has been significantly modified in terms of number of clubs 
that play in the competition, structure and even the competition name as changed.  
In the beginning, only each national league champion could play in CL, leaving 
strong teams, even potential winners, in the other European competitions. So, the 
European competitions were more leveled in terms of quality and difficulty than they 
are today.  
Nowadays UEFA has a country league ranking defined according to the country 
clubs success in European competitions. That ranking determines how many clubs from 
each country can play in CL and in European Competitions. A higher ranked national 
country puts more clubs in the European competitions and in CL than a lower ranked 
country. For example, national leagues of the top 3 countries can take up to 4 teams to 
the CL. The Portuguese league is currently in 4
th
 position meaning that 3 Portuguese 
teams have an opportunity to play in the CL. In the worst ranked leagues not even the 
national champions have direct entry guaranteed in European Competitions
16
.  
There were changes along the way and the CL is not for the European leagues 
winners anymore, but for the elite. However, one thing remains the same: only the most 
successful and competitive clubs of each European league play in the European 
Competitions.  
 
5.2. The hardest club competition in the World 
The group phase of the CL starts in September and the Final is in May, so it lasts for the 
entire season. The competition starts with 32 clubs forming 8 groups with 4 teams each. 
The group stage has 6 games and each team is awarded by UEFA with 3 points per 
victory and 1 point per draw. The 2 teams with the most points qualify to the playoffs, 
the 3
rd
 team is relegated to the Europa League (EL) and the last team is eliminated from 
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 www.uefa.com 
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European competitions. The three playoffs rounds (eighth-finals
17
, quarter-finals and 
semi-finals) are 2 games each and the final is only 1 game in a neutral pre-defined 
place. In the competition structure lays one of the reasons why it is so hard to win: it is 
not a competition based on regularity.  
Since the competition changed its name from Champion Clubs Cup to Champions 
League in 1992 no club won the competition two times in a row. It is an extremely hard 
competition to win and, when comparing to national leagues, it is much more difficult 
to predict a winner because, every year, there are several very strong candidates to the 
final victory.  
In 58 years of history, 22 clubs won the CL (or the Champions Club Cup) and, 
since 1992, 13 clubs won the CL. Table 2 presents the 12 most successful football clubs 
in CL (or the Champions Clubs Cup)  history in terms of final victories. 
 
Table 2 – Historical most successful teams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/history/index.html 
 
Besides the historical Nottingham Forest that nowadays does not even play in the 
English Premier League, all the clubs in Table 2 are present in our study.  
                                                 
17
 Also known as “Round of sixteen”, “Last sixteen” or “Octo finals” (Wikipedia) 
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5.3. The Construction of the Success Variable 
To measure the success of our clubs, we constructed a “Success” variable based on a 
ranking system. The ranking assumes that the CL is the “1st division” of European 
Football, the EL as the “2nd division” and the achievements of each club in these 
competitions will determine their ranking i.e. their success. The 8 (3
rd
 place of each 
group) teams that were relegated in the group stage from the CL to the EL go directly to 
the last 32 EL stage (the other 24 teams come from the EL group stage) and have a good 
chance of winning the competition (In the last six seasons, seven of the twelve EL 
finalists were relegated from CL). However, the relegation happens in December and 
any team can start the season with bad performances, so is a fair assumption that this 
relegation is also a second opportunity for success. Thus we have decided that: being in 
the group stage of CL has the same sportive importance as reaching the semifinal of EL; 
reaching the CL eighth-finals equals reaching the final of EL; reaching the CL quarter-
finals is equivalent to be the winner of EL.  
Our final success ranking is the sum of two variables: A Fixed Score and a 
flexible Bonus Score which can be seen as follows:   
  Fixed Score + Bonus Score for win or draw = Total Score (Success Ranking) 
 
5.3.1. Fixed Score and Bonus Score  
Both fixed and bonus scores are presented in Table 3. Fixed score points are awarded 
depending on each club final classification (or stage reached) in the European 
competitions. The bonus score points exists to guarantee the continuity in the Success 
Ranking. The scores are based on an exponential mode because it takes a lot more for a 
club to move from the semi-final to the final than to move from the eight-finals to the 
quarter-finals.  
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Table 3 – Success Ranking Construction  
 
The winner of the CL will get 2,981 fixed points while the finalist will get a 
fixed score of 1,096.6 points and so on. However, two teams can reach the same stage 
of the competition with different performances in all round/group stages. The bonus will 
reward the teams that had a better performance (more victories and draws) throughout 
the competition. 
So, in terms of bonus points each victory is worth the total bonus points of the 
stage where the victory occurred divided by the number of possible matches in that 
stage. For example, the semi-final of the CL is played over two games, so the bonus 
score for a victory is 346.6 (693.2 / 2 = 346.6). As the CL group stage is six matches, 
the bonus score for a victory is the total bonus score divided by six (34.51 / 6 = 5.75). A 
draw in the playoffs worth half the points of a victory and in the group stage worth one 
third of the points awarded to a victory, reflecting the different characteristics between 
the group stage and the playoffs while a defeat in any stage is awarded 0 bonus points.  
The final bonus score in one season is the sum of the bonus points earned in each 
different stage of the competitions. 
As previously mentioned, the exponential element in our success variable (that 
we believe to better translate the success in European competitions) also justifies the 
logarithmic mathematical application as proxy for the success of each club. To a better 
understand of our measure three examples are presented in Appendix 1. 
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6. Discussion & Results 
The upcoming section is divided into 2 subsections, with the aim of examining the 
Virtuous Circle in European Competitions. The first section focuses on the determinants 
of the financial power required to build a competitive team and the second stage is 
aimed to examine the determinants of success. 
 
6.1. Determinants of Revenues 
In Table 4 we present the estimated coefficients of the fixed effect panel regression of 
our first model. The dependent variable is the club revenues and the exogenous 
variables are: the GDP per capita, the city population divided by the number of the 
teams playing in CL and the log of our success variable. In Models I, II and III we 
regress each variable individually against the revenues. Model IV reports the results of 
regressing revenues on market area potential variables. In Model V we report the results 
of regressing revenues on all three variables. 
 
In Models III, IV and V we regress each variable individually against the revenues. 
 
Table 4 – Determinants of Revenues 
 
The results are not surprising. First all coefficients associated to the exogenous 
variables are statistically significant. Even when all variables are used in the some 
model the significance of the coefficients associated to all variables don’t change which 
suggest that all variables together explained the club revenues. These results are 
consistent with the results of other authors, such as Mourão (2010), and suggest that the 
geographic location of football club does matter. 
The results also show that the success in European competitions also helps to 
explain the club revenues even without considered the market area potential. 
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6.1.1. The Real Impact of Success in Revenues 
According to the previous Model V, for each additional point of our success 
(logarithmic) variable the club earned on average more €14.4milllion in revenues. Table 
5 relates the log variable for each CL stage with the actual UEFA prize money and with 
the model prediction for revenue increase by reaching each different stage in the 
competition. 
 
Table 5 – Revenues Increase Prediction vs UEFA Prize Money 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows us that part of the revenue growth is directly related to the UEFA 
prize money which is consistent with the fact that although the UEFA prize money is 
not the only revenue linking with the European competition success, is representative. 
Reaching higher stages of the competition also increases revenues from match day 
tickets, TV rights, marketing, merchandising and the very important asset appreciation 
which allows poorer teams to restart the Virtuous Circle.  
For example, Bayern Munich and Real Madrid, the winners of CL in 2013 and 
2014 won from prize money and television rights €55M and €57M respectively, close to 
what the model predicts for a CL winner. If we would consider the match day tickets 
and merchandising the revenue increase would be even bigger. Asset appreciation is not 
as important for these teams, because they are “buyers”, not “sellers” as for example FC 
Porto or SL Benfica. 
Chelsea in 2014, a “buyer” club, reached the semi-final and earned from TV 
rights and prize money €43.3 million. The model says that during 2009 and 2012 a 
semi-finalist would earn €44 million and considering that football clubs revenues have 
been increasing, it seems very accurate.  
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6.2. Determinants of Success 
6.2.1. Results with the Success Variable 
In Tables 6 and 7 we report the estimated coefficients of the fixed effect panel 
regression of our second model. The dependent variable is our success variable and the 
exogenous variables are several financial statement variables and one non-financial 
variable (coach dummy variable).  
In Table 6, Models I and II report the results of the fixed effect panel regression 
of our second model using as exogenous variables either the total wages or the ratio 
wages to revenues. Table 7 shows the inclusion of other financial and non-financial 
variables in order to analyse the incremental explanatory of those variables (Models III, 
IV, V, VI VII and VIII). Finally on Models IX, X and XI, we took off the wages and 
wages/revenues in order to understand the explanatory power of the other variables 
when “left alone”. 
 
Table 6 – Determinants of Success 1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows that without the other exogenous variables, both the total wages 
and the ratio wages/revenues are statistically insignificant. 
Table 7 shows that even with the inclusion of the others financial and non- 
financial variables, the coefficients associated to wages and to wages/revenues ratio are 
still statically insignificant. We can also assert from Table 7 that the European 
competitions success can be partly explained by the previous year capital expenditures 
and the total assets.  Oberstone (2009) also suggested that success is associated to the 
total assets of the club. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of these exogenous 
variables is relatively low.  
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Table 7 – Determinants of Success 2 
 
However, Table 7 also shows that capital expenditures in a year damage the 
prospect of success in that same year. This result suggests that the club’s investment in 
infrastructures and mainly in new players does not have an immediate impact on the 
success. The success only comes in the following year. We may speculate that these 
results are due to the fact that every year in the European competitions (especially CL) 
there are very good teams with players that are already together for a while and are fully 
adapted to the team. So, an investment in new players can bring problems of adaptation 
to the new colleges, to the city or to the style that the team plays. The study of Frick 
(2011) may also help explaining this phenomenon. The author finds evidence that the 
players increase its effort and performance over the years of their contract, i.e., as the 
contract approaches its end. 
 
6.2.2. Results with the Logarithmic of the Success Variable  
The Tables 8 and shows the estimated coefficients of the fixed effect panel regression of 
our second model but now the dependent variable is the logarithmic of our success 
variable. 
In Table 8, Models I and II report the results of the fixed effect panel regression of 
our second model using as exogenous variables either the total wages or the ratio wages 
to revenues. Then we include the other financial and non-financial variables in order to 
analyse the incremental explanatory of those variables (Table 9 - Models III, IV, V, VI 
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VII and VIII). Finally in order to better understand the explanatory power of these 
financial and non-financial variables, we took off the wages and wages/revenues (Table 
9 - Models IX, X and XI).  
 
Table 8 – Log Success 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows that while the total wages are statistically insignificant with a p 
value of 13% (Model I), the ratio wages to revenues are statistically significant and 
present a negative relation with success. These results together suggest that paying 
higher wages (more talent) increases the chance of success, however if the team 
struggles to pay high wages, since they are not proportional to their revenues those high 
salaries have a negative effect in the success of the team. 
 
Table 9 – Log Success 2  
 
Table 9, confirms that the coefficients associated to wages are statistically 
significant when other variables are included (Models III, IV and V). These results are 
consistent with Barajas and Rodríguez (2010) who detected a positive relation between 
wages and success.  
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The coefficient associated with the current year capital expenditures are negative 
reinforcing the idea discussed in section 6.2.1 that football players perform better after 
the first year in the club. It is also important to notice that the coefficients associated to 
the size of the club (total assets) are insignificant in all regressions. 
The coefficients associated to a change in debt (or total liabilities) are negative 
and statistically significant which suggest that an increase in debt decreases the 
probability of success.  
Finally, our results suggest also suggest that a change in the team coach decreases 
the probability of international success. 
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7. Conclusions 
When studying the financial situation of the major European clubs, it is necessary to be 
conscious about the limitations derived from the different languages and the low quality 
of the information that some financial statements provide. 
Despite the existing literature, studies focused on the connection between main 
financial issues of the football industry on international level are still rare or 
nonexistent.  
The present dissertation tries to fill in this gap, by exploring empirically the Lago 
et al (2004) Virtuous Circle on international level. This study shows that club’s 
revenues are explained by the market size, the market’s wealth and the sporting 
outcome, confirming the results of other authors such as Mourão (2010) and Barajas 
and Rodríguez (2010). 
Consistently to the presented bibliography, our results show that the amount of 
wages paid Barajas and Rodríguez (2010), the total assets Oberstone (2009) and 
previous year capital expenditures (capex t-1) are positively correlated with sporting 
success. However, the present year capital expenditures (capex t) are negatively 
correlated with success suggesting that the players perform worst in the first year of 
their contract due to integration problems or personal financial reasons (Frick 2011) and 
increasing productivity as their contract nears its end. There are several reasons for a 
coach change, some of them passing through the past success or failure. However, our 
results show that the coach change itself doesn’t help to explain sporting success. 
Although wages are the biggest expense of football clubs, our results  show that 
they are also the most important financial variable that helps to explain success, making 
it the most important financial variable in the industry. However our results also suggest 
that if the wages paid by club are not supported by revenues the effect on success is 
negative. 
Mourão (2012) pointed out that top clubs resort on financial instruments to grant 
and maintain their top players, even if provided by debt. Nevertheless our results show 
that increases of financial debt or total liabilities are negatively correlated with success. 
So, we believe that the football clubs that are incurring into unsustainable debt in the 
attempt of achieving success should be aware that this is a very risky strategy, with a 
real failure possibility (as our results show) that can result  in financial distress.  
 28 
The financial situation of the clubs in our sample is actually improving and 40% 
have revenues higher than 200 million, meaning that there are some clubs with financial 
conditions able to construct a team with good possibilities to win the competition once 
in a while.  Moreover 2012 was a good financial year in football as the value of the total 
assets grew more than the liabilities and the wages grew less than the revenues. 
Our results clearly show that the clubs that are revenue generators are the clubs 
that have more success. This fact is very damaging for the competitiveness of European 
Football, so, the introduction of a “salary cap”, a more equalitarian TV rights 
distribution or the obligation to have more players formed in the clubs playing, are 
measures that would give the smaller teams a real possibility to compete against the 
richest teams without compromising neither the sustainability of the industry nor the 
overall quality of the match.  
While there is an ongoing debate between football bosses and fans about the 
direction that football is going, further studies are needed to understand the real 
economic impact that outside funding has in football and in society.  Is it morally 
correct to assume that profits coming from natural resources are being used to power up 
millionaire teams (as Manchester City, PSG or Zenit), disregarding the welfare of the 
communities? Moreover, we must not forget that in the football industry almost all of its 
revenues are shared within a very limited set of people, as “Football Companies” and 
investment funds in the business don’t have many employees. 
Football clubs are treated more like business companies and although it makes the 
football clubs more efficient, it can also make them to lose their connection to the fans. 
The future of the football sport as the people’s entertainment is at risk and maybe even 
its natural beauty as a game may not be enough to stop it.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 – Total Score - Practical Examples APPENDIX 
Example 1: Arsenal played the CL in 2010. During the group stage had 4 wins, 1 
draw and moved to the next phase with 13 UEFA points. According to the total bonus 
point to this stage Arsenal was rewarded with 24so in the group stage Arsenal was 
awarded 24.9 (4 times 5.75 plus 5.73/3 for one draw) bonus points. In the last eighth-
finals Arsenal won 1 game and lost the other and so was rewarded with 46.9 additional 
bonus points. Because of goal difference Arsenal managed to move to the next stage. In 
the quarter-finals Arsenal draw 1 match, lost the other and was eliminated. The draw 
gave Arsenal 63.8 bonus and the elimination in the quarter-finals gave Arsenal a total of 
148.4 fixed points. So, the total points awarded to Arsenal in 2010 season was equal to 
284 points (148.4+24.9+46.9+63.8). 
Example 2: Braga during the 2011 season is an example for the exception 
mentioned in Table 3 as was relegated from CL to EL and so win two times the fixed 
points in one season. Braga in 2011 was relegated from CL to EL and lost the final of 
EL against Porto. So, Braga was awarded 20.1 fixed points for having reached the CL 
group stage plus 54.6 fixed points for having reached the final of EL. In terms of bonus 
points, Braga was also awarded from points earned in the CL group stage plus the bonus 
points from the different EL stages he played. In total Braga was awarded with 44.9 
bonus points for a total of 119.6 points.  
Example 3: Chelsea in 2008 lost the final of the CL in penalties (the result was a 
draw at the end of the game) against Manchester United. The bonus point of the final 
was the same for both teams, 942.2, but while Manchester United won the winner prize 
of 2,981 fixed points, Chelsea won only 1096.6 fixed points for being the defeated 
finalist. Both teams earned also bonus points for the previous stages of the competition. 
In the end Manchester United ended the season with 4799.1 total points while Chelsea 
earned 2779.6 total points. 
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Appendix 2 – The Sample Clubs 
This table lists the names, the home country and the ranking according to the Success 
Variable of the 31 football clubs in our final sample.  
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Appendix 3 – Variables Formula 
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Attachments 
 
 
Attachment 1 – The Virtuous Circle of the Leading Clubs 
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Attachment 2 – The Virtuous Circle of the Small Clubs 
 
 
 
